Inside the harrowing attack on Syria’s Druze

I woke to voice notes from Mazen, his Suwayda Druze dialect thick with tears.

“Jolani’s ISIS are massacring us,” he said, referring to the forces of Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa, formerly known as Jolani from his Al-Qaeda days. “Please talk to anyone you know in Washington to help us,” he pleaded.

Over the next five days, I exchanged information with Mazen, Muhannad, Makram, Gadeer, Shadi and other Druze in Syria, Lebanon and Israel, piecing together the unfolding horror. I was the only non-Druze in the group.

To us, it was clear: Damascus had ordered a massacre against the Druze in southern Syria.

As a Lebanese civil war survivor, I’ve faced near-death experiences and reported on assassinations. Despite losing close friends to violence in Lebanon and Iraq, I’ve trained myself to detach, keeping emotions separate from my work.

But no one grows numb to massacres. Once you connect with victims, helplessness sets in.

On normal days, I make noise about Middle Eastern issues, but as Druze fell to Islamist bullets, I felt powerless. How do you stop death? How do you make the world hear?

The Druze in Israel worked tirelessly, lobbying for the Jewish state to intervene and deter Sharaa. Israel eventually acted, destroying Islamist convoys heading south and striking a building in Damascus to warn Sharaa.

Suddenly, the narrative shifted to international law — not condemning Syria for killing its citizens, but criticizing Israel for violating Syrian sovereignty. This same Israeli action had previously weakened Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, paving Sharaa’s path to power.

Yet now, Syrian sovereignty was the focus.

After Israel’s warning, Sharaa paused but didn’t stop. Cunningly, he continued the violence through proxies.

“He ordered his forces to swap military uniforms for tribal outfits, calling them clans,” Mazen said. “Our guys in Suwayda captured several ‘clansmen’ who still carried military IDs.”

Mazen, Muhannad and others eventually outlined the attacking force.

Three of Sharaa’s top lieutenants — Hussain al-Salama (Chief of Intelligence), Youssef Al-Hajr (HTS Political Chief) and Muhammad al-Jassim (Abu Amsheh, a Turkish-backed commander) — orchestrated the tribal attack.

Salama and Al-Hajr, from the Aqidat clan, and Al-Jassim, from the Nuaym clan, both based in northeastern Syria, used state-supervised mosque networks to rally 15,000 fighters whom they bused over 350 miles to attack the Druze in the south.

No ties linked the northern and southern clans. The “revenge” narrative was bogus.

Outnumbered and outgunned, the Druze suffered heavy losses over three days.

Sharaa’s Islamists entered homes, massacring families including Evangelical pastor Khalid Mezher and 20 of his relatives. An American citizen, Hosam Saraya, visiting Suwayda, was dragged in the street and executed with his family.

A captured government fighter confessed that Sharaa’s forces were instructed to wear civilian clothes and use civilian vehicles to evade Israeli airstrikes. They were ordered to kill any Druze they encountered, either by shooting or beheading. Of the 3,500 fighters transported in 800 vehicles, 200 were foreign Islamists from Chechnya and Central Asia, including suicide bombers tasked with targeting Druze gatherings.

As clashes continued, Mazen’s updates grew grim: “This is where my retired uncle was killed in his house,” or “That’s where my maternal cousins were gunned down.”

We wanted to console him, but there was no time for emotions — not for Mazen, Muhannad, or any of us. US Envoy Tom Barrack claimed the perpetrators were Islamists posing as government forces. We were certain he was wrong, likely unaware of US intelligence and echoing Damascus’s talking points.

Sharaa denied his government’s role in the onslaught, yet water, electricity and internet were cut off in Suwayda. Government checkpoints blocked food and medicine.

Our sources went silent. Mazen explained that batteries were dying, and those with satellite phones were busy searching for missing loved ones or burying the dead. The Druze were drowning in blood and grief, unable to update us, their window to the world.

Washington announced a ceasefire on Friday, but it didn’t take hold until Sunday. When the shooting stopped, the scale of the disaster emerged. The tally stands so far at 3,300 dead Druze out of Syria’s 700,000 Druze population — the equivalent of America’s September 11 and Israel’s October 7.

With electricity and internet restored, videos surfaced: hundreds of summary executions, an unarmed Druze man shot by Sharaa’s forces without question, another pleading for his life before being killed for being Druze. Government forces looted shops and homes, desecrated houses of worship and left graffiti vowing to exterminate the Druze and establish an Islamist state.

President Trump met Sharaa in May and announced the removal of sanctions on Syria. But the Suwayda massacre prompted the House Financial Services Committee to reconsider. Instead of fully repealing the 2019 Caesar sanctions, they voted to amend them, allowing removal only if Syria stops killing civilians, including minorities.

Congress has taken a step in the right direction. Past experiments — lifting sanctions on Iran or funneling Qatari billions to Hamas — showed that Islamists don’t moderate with money. There’s no reason to believe Sharaa will be different.

“Trust but verify” must be America’s policy on Syria. Washington isn’t even demanding accountability.

Hussain Abdul-Hussain is a Foundation for Defense of Democracies research fellow.